

**POLITICAL PORTRAIT OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BRITISH
MILITARY AND POLITICAL ESTABLISHMENT, WORKING IN
THE SOUTH CAUCASUS IN 1918- 1919**

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Abstract: In the political arena of the South Caucasus region, throughout the period of existence of the independent republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia (1918-1920), many historical names flashed like a kaleidoscope, such as leaders of political parties, public figures, diplomats, statesmen, military leaders, heads of numerous missions, and representatives of various intelligence services. The post-war Caucasus of 1918-1920 resembled a huge theatrical stage, on a hill, on which dramatic events unfolded, which played a fateful role in the history of the peoples of this region. Subsequently, the names of many of those who created this story entered the world encyclopaedias. Prominent figures of the British state, military establishment, who played a serious role in this series, stand out, building the policy of His Majesty's Government in the South Caucasus in 1918-1919.

Keywords: *Dunsterville, MacDonnell, Thomson, Teague-Jones, British troops, Azerbaijan Democratic Republic*

Introduction

Free access to various kinds of archival documents (dispatches, reports, government reports, telegrams, analytic references, etc.) makes it possible to recreate political portraits of prominent figures of that period. It is noteworthy that many of them left behind a good memoir literature, some of which was subsequently published as independent books [MacDonnell, Ranald. (1938); Dunsterville L. (1925); Peter Hopkirk, Reginald Teague-Jones (1990); Brian Pearce (1997); Brian Pearce, W.M. Thomson (1997)].

There is no doubt that all this huge layer of sources not only recreates the course of the historical realities of that time, but also allows us to talk about the role and significance of specific people, who create this story. The assessment of a particular person depends on political and national preferences. Therefore, an important factor in the construction of any document must be taken into account the identity of the author of the text, as well as the degree of its awareness of developments on the ground. The British military and political elite, leaving behind a lot of analytical references, biographical sketches, undoubtedly thereby enriched our knowledge of the truth of the history of Azerbaijan-British relations in 1918-1919. Such a layer of materials also allows, to some extent, to make a kind of portrait of the author himself through the prism of his activities. Since for the most part all memoir literature is written hot on the heels of events, they clearly contain the spirit of that time is captured, and at the

same time, in almost all expositions, the presence of a certain imperial taste is felt. The existence of a body of archival documents and memoir literature allows us to consider now the role of a particular historical figure and his role and influence in the events unfolding in the South Caucasus. To date, Azerbaijan historical science, keeping pace with the world, quite successfully uses the English memoir literature in its works. This article aims to dwell more closely on the characteristics of some of the well-known military commanders, as well as representatives of diplomatic missions located in the South Caucasus in 1918-1919, and who implemented their state policies. Those discussed in this article, following their respective instructions, were forced due to certain circumstances, to adjust the political policy of their governments on the ground. At times, dramatic struggles forced the British to adopt extraordinary decisions that did not always coincide with the general course of government in their South Caucasian politics. An important factor was also the pressure exerted on the British by the young states, in whose territories the occupying troops were stationed.

The British Commands and the South Caucasus

During the construction of their independent states by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia in 1918-1920, the most difficult for the British command was their involvement in territorial disputes between them. Very often, the fate of people living in these states depended on the specific decision of the representative of the Alliance, his personal attitude to a particular nation, under the influence of many factors. In this regard, an indicator in the solution of territorial issues often surfaced the Armenian question, which the British had in each case to resolve in favour of a particular state. Numerous archival documents that have been deposited in the funds of the British National Archives are literally filled with the Armenian correspondence: appeals to memorandums, letters addressed to world powers or to the British command on the ground – the pendulum of sympathy and support from the Alliance forces often outweighed the side. This undoubtedly happened due to the activities of specific personalities on whom the Armenians tried to exert pressure. In this regard, in modern historiography, describing the events in the South Caucasus of 1918-1920, one or another side often tries to impose personal labels, and calls them respectively Armenophobes or Muslimophobes, depending on the decisions taken by the British on the specific issues. Due to the fact that the main kitchen of the political decisions developed was brewed far beyond the Caucasus region itself and rested on the Versailles Gate, it was Western political and public figures, prominent diplomats, high-ranking government officials who played an important role in shaping these decisions. Undoubtedly, in a small article it is impossible to mention all the participants - representatives of the great powers, who by the will of history found themselves in the Caucasian foreground and are trying to dictate their rules to the "Small Peoples" in the occupied territories. Our task is to mention the most iconic figures of this group of representatives of this group of representatives, and by their example to show the role of individuals who have left a tangible mark in history. The very first, rather short-term period of stay of British troops in the South Caucasus has its own peculiarity: the British attempted to occupy one single oil city of Baku and establish complete control over the

Caspian water area. At the time of the Russian revolution, which led to the collapse of the Eastern Front, the collapse of the Tsarist Empire, allowed the Bolsheviks to make an attempt at reconciliation. The Brest-Litovsk treaty left the Caucasus undefended. British India was open to invasion by Turkish-German troops, heading the east through the Caspian Sea and the trans-Caspian railway towards Afghanistan. The British tried at all costs to prevent these actions, despite the fact that for this purpose, they had very few troops at their disposal. That is why it was considered necessary to establish an alliance with the local population to resist the Turkish-German troops. Therefore, British agents and military officers in Central Asia and the Transcaspian were hurriedly sent to Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, to explain the situation on the ground, and identify what forces were available to resist the Turkish-German forces [Дж. Гасанлы (2011): 245].

One of the officers selected for this purpose was Major J.M. Goldsmiths, who was tasked with ensuring the success of Major General Lionel Charles Dunsterville's proposed operation (later called Dunsterforce). He appeared in Baku on 13th February 1918, and shortly thereafter was relocated with his men to Tiflis, where he interacted with the Caucasian Military Committee existing there at that time, as well as with local political parties, including the Bolsheviks. Goldsmith also managed to establish contact with British troops in Persia. It is noteworthy that a later book by Dunsterville himself does not mention the existence of this Committee [Dunsterville L. (1925)]. The Turkish scholar Bülent Gökay writes about him in his work, referring to the 86-page report of Major Goldsmith, which was addressed to the director of the British Intelligence. According to Goldsmith, at the end of February 1918 Dunsterville was trying to establish relations with S. Shaumian, promising him 40 Ford cars, in exchange for the Baku gasoline he needs, and assistance in protecting the city [Bülent Gökay (1998): 30; Bülent Gökay (1996): 45]. This fact is also not mentioned in the memoirs of Dunsterville himself. According to all known sources, both archival and memoir, Dunsterville appears in Baku in August 1918 and the main preparatory work of his Baku deployment is prepared by Vice-Consul Aeneas Ranald MacDonnell (Lord MacDonell), who left behind an interesting book detailing the activities of his South Caucasian period [MacDonnell, Ranald. (1938); Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008): 70]. MacDonnell's work is also well covered in documents deposited in the UK's National Archives, which has been widely used by us.

World War I was approaching its tragic end. It was during this period that the name of the former British Vice-Consul in Tehran, who by that time was already an employee of the British mission in Tiflis, and later in Baku, MacDonnell. This British intelligence officer, who played a different role in the historical events of 1918 in the Caucasus, left behind many memories that allow us to analyse Britain's policies in the region. All the actions of R. MacDonnell himself characterized him as a rather cunning politician, an intelligence officer, who managed to simultaneously establish contacts with almost all the main political figures - participants in the South Caucasian events of 1918. Being friends of the Bolsheviks, trying to constantly flirt with them, but in fact remaining indisputably their obvious opponent, he at the same time quite seriously assessed the pain of the Bolshevik potential, seeing in their presence a serious danger for the British. As the events of the early months of 1918 showed, it was MacDonnell who was one of those politicians who, in order to hold the front and successfully occupy the region, first

lamented the formation of the volunteer army. Since the Armenians, burning with the desire for revenge against the Turks, remained on the front lines, they were the best option for this purpose. It is on them that the English intelligence officer chose. In them, he saw the local allies that Dunsterville needed in the fight against the Turkish army. Undoubtedly, it was the fact that the Armenian divisions continued to hold positions on the front lines that encouraged the British to pay them. In order not to look in the eyes of another part of the population, especially Muslim, as patrons of Armenians, the British created the so-called Finance Committee, whose tasks included allocating all financial assistance to various military units, only through existing Russian personnel. It is quite logical that the Armenians, having received real money in their hands, and supported by assurances from the British, understood that the British mission was organized to help them [Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008): FO. 248-1196]. Subsequently, R. MacDonnell, having already experienced Armenian pressure, wrote about his awareness of the Armenian character, comparing them "with the Indians who dye and inflate their breasts to frighten the enemy with their importance, but in fact boast of the force behind them." [Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008) 68]. However, it was R. MacDonnell who had the main initiatives in finding "upper allies" for Dunsterville, whose knowledge of the region itself at the time of his arrival in Baku was very limited. To implement the British plans, R. MacDonnell made several tours in Baku, setting as his main goal the preparation for the landing of British troops here. As noted above, the British Vice-Consul tried to establish close relations with various political forces, flirting with both the Bolsheviks and the Social Democrats, and, of course, with the Dashnaks. He established a fairly close relationship between S. Shaumian and A. Djaparidze, and he was also acquainted with other commissars. He was more cautious in his dealings with Armenians, knowing that the Baku commissars did not fully trust the Armenian National Soviet. He visited them at night, disguised as a Russian soldier [Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008): 68-69]. The tragic events of March find R. MacDonnell in Baku. By the will of fate, he who in many ways contributed to the financing of Armenian weapons, had to witness how these weapons were used. Thus, albeit indirectly, the British found themselves implicated in brutal murders committed by armed gangs against the peaceful Muslim population. According to the report of the Extraordinary Investigative Commission, 12,000 people were killed by Bolshevik-Armenian forces. MacDonnell distanced himself entirely from these tragic events and confirmed that a brutal massacre was committed by the Armenians. "The Armenians joined with the Bolsheviks and turned everything into a massacre of their hereditary enemies, the Tatars, who suffered greatly and had no chance against the organized forces of the Armenians and the Red Guards with the support of the fleet." [Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008): FO. 248-1196]. MacDonnell was arrested by the Bolsheviks and was tried by a military tribunal on charges of attempting to organize a fleet for the arrival of British troops. For lack of evidence, he was released [Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008): FO. 248-1196]. Ultimately, we can conclude that the Baku mission of the British Vice Consul MacDonnell was unsuccessful. In fact, MacDonnell failed to solve any of the tasks set. The March events discredited the British in the eyes of the local Muslim population. He failed to persuade 600 idle Russian officers to join the Red Army, and thus have reliable soldiers among the Bolsheviks. He failed to

prepare the fleet so that it would be available to follow instructions from General Bicherkhov or General Dunsterville at the right time. That is the reason why the Vice-consul soon left the city of Baku [H. МАКСВЕЛЛ (2014): 94].

By this period, General Dunsterville occupied centre stage in the Caucasus. Operation Dunsterforce is well covered by him not only in memoir literature, but also in the documents of the British National Archives. It is from this package of documents, "Stalky's Reminiscences," that we can see a portrait of the general himself, or "Stalky," as he calls himself in his memoirs. The word stalky means clever, measured, cunning. Young Dunsterville's comrades said he had a good nature. It's interesting that the famous English writer Rudyard Kipling, his classmate at Westward Ho school where military cadres for colonial service were forged, later wrote the book "Stalky & Co", based on his memories of Dunsterville [Carrington, C.E. (1955): 22]. General Dunsterville himself was closely involved in the preparation of his expedition, was concerned about the situation developing in the South Caucasus. The general had difficulty getting allotted troops. The British military command had disagreements over the entire mission of Dunsterville's Baku operation. He reported to the War Department, with which Dunsterville had a strained relationship. The leadership did not approve of the enthusiasm of the general, who drew the basic information of their British intelligence. Without going into the details of the campaign itself, which is reflected in historiography, we note that the failure of Dunsterville's operation was predetermined by many factors. Fighting in a foreign land, chasing enemy forces of the legitimate Azerbaijani government, the mission of the British, even carried a rush to the personal characteristics of "Stalky" was doomed to defeat. The Armenians did not meet the hope of the general as loyal allies, after having invited the British, and also actively taken part in the events of August 1918, and tried to take a leading position in the fight against the advancing forces of the Caucasian Islamic Army. For the failure of the Baku operation, Dunsterville was relieved of his post. His troops were disbanded and replaced by regular units of the British 14th Division, whilst Dunsterville tried to regain his former reputation.

Amongst the main characters of the early period of the British presence in the region, it is impossible to avoid mentioning Soviet historiography's sensational view of the personality of the British intelligence officer, Captain Reginald Teague-Jones. Moscow accused British intelligence officials of being responsible for the deaths of Baku's commissars. According to the Soviet foreign minister, Britain was "thoroughly accused of murdering unprotected captives." Despite the denials of the British Government, the Soviet Government continued to press these charges, which were widely published in Soviet historical references. Even now, after so many years, after the end of the Soviet regime, the events that led to the murders are still shrouded in veils of mystery and ambiguity. The British government claimed that the commissars had been brutally executed by their own compatriots and enemies in Ashgabat. The fact that that particular anti-Bolshevik group naming themselves the Ashkabad Committee were supported by the British, does not mean that the British were responsible for the executions. Captain Reginald Teague-Jones was involved in a challenging and dangerous mission. He was fluent in Russian, having been brought up and educated in St. Petersburg. After serving in the Indian Police for several years, he was transferred to the elite Foreign and Political

Department of the Indian Police. Finding himself in the spring of 1918 in the South Caucasus, he could not even have imagined the consequences of the trip that would haunt him for the rest of his life. At the age of 29, Teague-Jones was accused by none other than Leon Trotsky of being responsible for the death of 26 Baku commissars, and he was branded by Moscow as "a cursed representative of the blood of imperialism." Although official British sources proved that Teague-Jones was at that time in Ashgabat, at a distance of more than 200 miles from the place of execution, L. Trotsky described him as ... "the immediate actual organizer". Because of fear of communist persecution, Teague-Jones went into hiding for the rest of his life. Before changing his name, he provided the Foreign Office with a brief account of the circumstances of the killings. He lived under the name of Ronald Sinclair for the rest of his life. He kept his identity secret from even his closest friends. It was only after his death, in the year of his centenary, that the truth about his disappearance appeared in an obituary published in *The Times*. However, it is worth mentioning that the early records of Teague-Jones, which he first attempted to publish in 1920 (these were his personal diaries, telegrams and memoirs), subsequently allowed the English historian Peter Hopkirk to publish a book: "The Adventure of the Bolsheviks, Turkmens and Tatars", which is a serious source for the study of the events of 1918 on the former southern outskirts of Russia [Peter Hopkirk, Reginald Teague-Jones (1990)]. Teague-Jones diary is undoubtedly not only an excellent source for reconstructing many details of the events of the 1918 period, it also allows us to judge the character of the author himself, and his direct role in the unfolding events. It can even be said that he to some extent supplements the information from the memoirs of MacDonnell and Dunsterville, revealing the true course of action of the British command on the ground. Teague-Jones mentions many names in his diary and gives them characteristics. A large place in the diary is given to the Transcaspian, and all the participants of the Ashgabat Committee. In general, he was twice in Baku before Dunsterforce appeared there, both times for a very short period. During the second visit to Baku, at a time when the fate of the city was already determined, and crowds of women tried to leave the city (Teague Jones dated this as 31st July 1918), he tried to dissolve into the crowd of escapees, taking with him an important and rare a map of the harbour, with an image of the city's coastal defences. "My idea was," Teague-Jones wrote in his diary, "that assuming the surrender of Baku to the Turks, we would still be able to prevent them by mining Baku Bay" [Peter Hopkirk, Reginald Teague-Jones (1990): 99]. Fortunately, as is known, the plan to mine the Bay of Baku was never implemented. Teague-Jones wrote in detail about the Baku events of the summer of 1918, but his narrative is more a memoir, without an admixture of political analysis of the events, unlike the books of MacDonnell and Dunsterville. During the Dunsterforce Expedition in Baku, Teague-Jones performed the duties of an intelligence officer, bearing personal responsibility for recruiting agents for the Dunsterforce headquarters. However, Teague Jones was soon recalled to the Transcaspian, against the wishes of Dunsterville, who considered him useful. According to Dunsterville's diary, "in spite of the Baku drama turning occasionally to comedy, an atmosphere of tragedy persisted. As unwitting players in this drama, at times we tended to laugh at the grotesque and fantastic scenes, even though we were constantly weighed down by the anticipation of impending disaster [[Peter Hopkirk, Reginald Teague-Jones (1990): 115].

Thus, despite the first, very short period of stay in the South Caucasus of the occupying forces, and the fact that their participants were quite professional military commanders, diplomats, intelligence officers (we can mention such names as Colonel Stokes, General Malleison), their attempts to implement their plans failed. The course of historical events brings here new Britons, already as representatives of the forces of the Alliance, which allowed them to establish themselves here as an occupying force. As we know, in the autumn of 1918, the German-Turkish bloc was defeated in the First World War. On October 30, Turkey signed the Treaty of Mudros, the terms of which proved difficult not only for the Ottoman Empire itself, but implied serious changes in the life of the newly created South Caucasian states. As a result of the Mudros Armistice, the Allied forces invaded the territory of the Southern Caucasus.

William Montgomerie Thomson and the Caucasian Republics

A new stage begins, when the young states of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia had to combine the construction of new state institutions of power with the presence of British occupation troops here. This time, the gallery of names representing the participants from foggy Brittan is expanding. The period from November 1918 to August 1919, when the British occupation troops were stationed in strategically important places in the South Caucasus (Baku, Tiflis, Gori, Batumi, controlled the Caucasian Railway, seaports), the tasks of the British, the nature of their activities, the methods of their work here can be said to change dramatically. Now they had to deal with three newly formed states, trying, despite numerous difficulties, to build their independent national policy in accordance with the realities of that period. This time, among the representatives of His Majesty's Government, the most striking figure stands out in the name of Lieutenant General Sir William Montgomerie Thomson, who arrived in Baku on 17th November on the flagship cruiser "President Kruger", ironically, the same vessel that carried General Dunsterville.

Most of the British participants in the South Caucasus during this period had a tradition of keeping their own diaries, in addition to the mandatory daily report, monthly reports, final reports on the work done, or analytical reports, and other kinds of documents sent to the government. This was followed by Thomson, who declared himself Governor-General of Baku upon his arrival in the South Caucasus. For many years, his diary was considered lost. However, as it turned out, a typewritten copy of it was kept in the family archive of the Thomson family and was subsequently handed over to Mrs. D. Harper, one of the daughters of General Thomson to the "Leeds Russian Archive". Much later, the English historian Brian Pearce managed, with the permission of his family, to publish his diary in the journal "Revolutionary Russia" co-authored with Thomson. [Pearce, Brian and W.M. Thomson (1997)]. Since Thomson was one of the main actors in the South Caucasus, on whose actions and decisions the fate of many unfolding events often depended, it is understandable that the period of his stay here is widely covered in various sources, both archival and periodicals. However, Thomson's diary revealed many aspects of his character, details of his personal attitude, both in relation to individuals, and to the states themselves, on the territory, which he occupied. His official reports were written in a precise language, however there is much sarcasm in

his diary. Many of his characterisations, both to the leadership of the South Caucasian states and to the state course itself, often have an imperial flavour. In short, in the pages of his diary, the general forgets about the art of diplomacy, but he strictly adheres to diplomacy in his government reports. Taking examples from his diary, "the Azerbaijan government, being a Turkish creation, was very careful not to irritate anyone and readily agreed to any British proposal. The Cabinet of Ministers took a very prudent moderate course between tyranny and confiscation of property, although in many respects harsh methods were used, which they learned from the Turks. Fraud was endemic among officials; bribes were taken even in the Cabinet of Ministers. It should be remembered, however, that oil policy is always a dirty business and continues to remain so not only in Baku, but also in any other place. The Georgian Government presented itself as a problem of a different nature. President Jordania was a staunch and unyielding fanatic with no distinct personality. The Cabinet of Ministers was an unpleasant team of adventurers chaired by M. Gegechkori, a sneaky lawyer with whom it was very difficult to deal. The Armenian government, in fact, was the dictatorship of M. Khatisyan, a capable man and experienced, and one of the very few in the Caucasus with a sense of humour. In general, Armenians focused on hating Muslims, and founded parties of all shades, but as often happens in such cases, power was vested in a well-organized extremist minority, the Dashnaktsutyun Party". [Pearce, Brian and W.M. Thomson (1997): 88] Such diary entries differed from his official speech, delivered for the first time since his arrival in the South Caucasus, at the Baku Bay, in which he left no doubt about the purposes of his presence here. "We are coming to you," he addresses a group of those who meet him, "with the aim of restoring order by removing the German and Turkish centres of ferment that impede law and order." [Азербайджанская Демократическая Республика (1918-1920) (1998): 106]

As you know, the leaders wished for success in the process of establishing independent states, but unfortunately, it was accompanied by many misunderstandings, mutual claims against each other, often escalating into conflicts and local wars. The resolution of the complex territorial conflicts between Georgia and Armenia and Azerbaijan was kept in the bloody grip of these states, depriving them in many respects of the possibility of peaceful, creative construction. The British occupation forces attempted to separate the conflicting parties on different sides of the barricade. In fact, they acted as arbitrators, supporting the parties on a case-by-case basis, as required. Thomson had an undeniably significant role in this process. However, the fact that its decisions were also put at the forefront in resolving territorial disputes spoke of the conditions in which these states had to build independent foreign and domestic policies. As subsequent events have shown, one of the most difficult issues in the attempts to peacefully resolve the territorial conflicts in the South Caucasus throughout their stay here is the issue of resolving the status of Karabakh, a region known for its long and dramatic history. In this regard, the role of General Thomson himself made endless attempts to resolve the Karabakh problem, before the final decision on this issue was made at the Versailles Conference. This statement is by no means related to the fact that he took the position of the Azerbaijani government on this issue, and therefore his actions are welcomed in modern Azerbaijani historiography. The objectivity of his decisions follows from arguments made by the general himself, who motivates his

decisions with concrete facts and thoughts. Characterising Thomson's role in the Karabakh conflict, we must mention his main achievement was the expulsion of Andronik's military forces, whose hands were stained with the blood of many thousands of human lives. Despite huge pressure from his compatriots at home, Thomson forced Andronik to retreat ingloriously from the South Caucasus in the spring of 1919. There are many documents signed by Thomson in the British Archives concerning territorial problems, however there are no references to Karabakh in his diaries. He mentions specific regions such as Kars, Nachichevan, and Zangezur. Several times he mentions Andonik. He regarded the territorial issues as the internal business of the states, until such time as the main decisions were made at the Versailles Conference. It should be recognized that a far-sighted politician, an excellent strategist, General Thomson, was well aware that it was on the key issue (territorial) that it was necessary to show maximum diplomacy in order to keep the region calm, while managing to regulate economic problems. According to representatives of the Military Department, it was General Thomson who was able to show a remarkable example by his actions concerning how to resolve painful issues [Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (2008): FO 608-85]. I think we can agree that in the difficult conditions of the South Caucasian reality, Thomson managed to assemble a team of professionals (meaning both the English side and specialists from among the local population), around which the bulk of those who came here to serve the British government. Another question is to what extent they served the interests of the states of the South Caucasus. The general himself, in the final part of his diary, giving a fairly high assessment of his mission, asks himself: "If we had a mandate and a certain policy, would we be able to complete the task of establishing calm in the Caucasus and complete the work of the nascent republics? Does the example of the adoptive parent apply to the custom of throwing the infant away with soapy water, having previously helped him in the burning waters of self-determination? Have we done something similar to spanking and feeding the baby at the same time? Haven't we fed the baby sympathy far beyond his opportunities for assimilation, giving him a "de jure" confession, while at the same time giving leeway to Denikin's men in British uniforms and British machine guns. We can't shake off our guilt so easily." [Pearce, Brian and W.M. Thomson (1997): 90] As we can see from the concluding words of the general's diary, he was aware of the complexity, and the sharpness of the tasks ahead. The British could not guarantee the independence from the Bolshevik threat, which soon put an end to the young states of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia.

In addition to General W. Thomson in the gallery of names of those present in 1918-1919 in the South Caucasus, you can cite the names of the commanders of the British troops' generals - Corey, Beach, Shuttleworth, officers Neil, Stewart, Walker, and many others.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, within the framework of an article, it is impossible to highlight these personalities in detail, indicating their role in the fate of the South Caucasian peoples. Undoubtedly, each of them, being the leader of the Allied forces, was consistent in the implementation of the effective directives assigned to them. However, it is also obvious that each of them carried his own human factors. And if in some particular situations it

could seem that the British show visible sympathy for one of the nations, whether Armenians or Georgians or Azerbaijanis, then it was also indisputable that they were and remained British subjects, faithfully serving the interests of His Majesty, putting their interests at the forefront.

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